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Abstract. An antagonistic differential game of hyperbolic type with a
separable linear vector pay-off function is considered. The main result is
the description of all ε-Slater saddle points consisting of program strate-
gies, program ε-Slater maximins and minimaxes for each ε ∈ RN> for this
game. To this purpose, the considered differential game is reduced to find
the optimal program strategies of two multicriterial problems of hyperbolic
type. The application of approximation enables us to relate these problems
to a problem of optimal program control, described by a system of ordinary
differential equations, with a scalar pay-off function. It is found that the
result of this problem is not changed, if the players use positional or pro-
gram strategies. For the considered differential game, it is interesting that
the ε-Slater saddle points are not equivalent and there exist two ε-Slater
saddle points for which the values of all components of the vector pay-off
function at one of them are greater than the respective components of the
other ε-saddle point.
Introduction. The present paper is a continuation of the results of [11]
and [12], related to the antagonistic multicriterial differential games, described
by a hyperbolic dynamic system.
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Games with a separable linear vector pay-off function (see [12, Section 2])
are considered here. For such games, in the case when the players are using only
program strategies, the structure of the ε-Slater saddle points and the ε-Slater
maximins and minimaxes for each ε ∈ RN> (i.e. ε = (ε1, . . . , εN ) | ∀εi > 0 for i =
1, . . . , N), is found (Section 1). These results enable us to describe the set of all
ε-Slater saddle points consisting of program strategies, in the more general case,
when the sets of strategies of the players do not consist only of program strategies.
The approximation model, which reduces the given differential antagonistic game
described by a hyperbolic boundary-value problem to a control problem of more
simple type, described by a system of ordinary differential equations, is presented
(Section 2). When the conditions of regularity are satisfied [6, p. 132], the
maximizing strategy of this control problem is a program strategy.
As an illustration of these results, given in Section 1 and Section 2, a model
example of a dynamic system, described by the following hyperbolic boundary-
value problem
(0.1)
∂2y/∂t2 = ∂2y/∂x2 in G = (0, 1) × (0, pi)
y(0, x) = (∂y/∂t)(0, x) = 0 for x ∈ Ω = (0, pi)
−(∂y/∂x)(t, 0) = u(t) + v(t), (∂y/∂x)(t, pi) = 0 for t ∈ (0, 1),
is considered (Section 3). The following bicriterial differential antagonistic game
is introduced:
(0.2) 〈Ξ, {U10 ,V10}, {ρ1(h(1)), ρ2(h(1))}〉.
As strategies of (0.2) the players are using the scalar, measurable functions u(t)
and v(t), subject to the conditions |u(t)|≦ 1, |v(t)|≦ 1, ∀t ∈ [0, 1], i.e. the sets of
program strategies are
U = U10 = {U ÷ u(.) | |u(t)|≦ 1,∀t ∈ [0, 1]},
V = V10 = {V ÷ v(.) | |v(t)|≦ 1,∀t ∈ [0, 1]}.
The controllable system Ξ of (0.2) is described by (0.1) and the vector
pay-off function has two components
ρ(h(T )) = (ρ1(h(T )), ρ2(h(T ))) =
(∫ pi
0
y′(1, x)dx,−
∫ pi/2
0
y(1, x)dx
)
,
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i.e.
ρ1(h(T )) =
∫ pi
0
y′(1, x)dx, ρ2(h(T )) = −
∫ pi/2
0
y(1, x)dx,
where y′(t, x) = (∂y/∂t)(t, x) and h(t) = (y(t, .), y′(t, .)) ∈ H = L2(0, pi) ×
(H12 (0, pi))
∗, ∀t ∈ [t0, T ], see [11, Theorem 1]. We should note that these com-
ponents are linear and strongly continuous functionals in H, [12]. Without any
restrictions, suppose that the first player choosing the strategy U ∈ U strives to
smaller possible values of all criteria ρi(h(T )), i = 1, 2; the second player using a
strategy V ∈ V, strives to their maximization. Each player chooses a strategy of
his own which is independent of the other player’s strategy.
We shall look for all ε-Slater saddle points consisting of program strategies
in game (0.2) for ∀ε ∈ R2>. Hence, from the considerations of Section 1 and
Section 2, we can suppose that the players are using only program strategies of
U10 and V10 .
For this specific antagonistic differential game (0.2), the sets of all ε-Slater
saddle points, ε-Slater maximins and minimaxes for ∀ε ∈ R2>, are found in Section
3. Also we shall describe the set ρ(h(1; 0, 0, 0, U∗ , V ∗)), i.e. the set of the values
of the vector functional ρ(h(.)) for T = 1, t = 0 and initial conditions (0, 0) of
problem (0.1) for all ε-Slater saddle points (U∗, V ∗) of (0.2) ∀ε ∈ R2> and the
set of all ε-Slater maximins and minimaxes of (0.2). All these sets are subsets
of ρ(D(T ; p0)), where D(T ; p0) = {h(1; 0, 0, 0, U, V )|U ∈ U10 , V ∈ V10}, see [11], is
the domain of attainment of the controllable system Ξ of (0.2) from the initial
position p0 = (0, 0, 0) and T = 1, and this set ρ(D(T ; p0)) also will be constructed
in Section 3.
Game (0.2) is interesting with these constructed sets, since the ε-Slater
saddle points of (0.2) are not equivalent [11] and there exist two ε-Slater saddle
points for which the values of all components of the vector pay-off function at one
of them are greater than the respective components of the other ε-saddle point.
1. ε-Slater saddle points, maximins and minimaxes for games
with a separable linear pay-off function. The following more general multi-
criterial antagonistic differential game with a vector pay-off function is considered:
(1.1) 〈Ξ, {U ,V}, {ρi(h(T ))}i∈N〉,
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where N = {1, . . . , N}, N ≧ 1 is the number of criteria and Ξ is described by the
following boundary-value problem of hyperbolic type:
(1.2)
∂2y/∂t2 = Ay + b1u1 + c1v1 + f1 in G = (t0, T )× Ω,
y|t=t0 = y0, ∂y/∂t|t=t0 = y1 in Ω
σ1∂y/∂νA + σ2y = b2u2 + c2v2 + f2 in Σ = (t0, T )× Γ,
where the numbers σi ∈ {0, 1}, i = 1, 2, σ1 + σ2≧ 1.
All parameters in (1.2) satisfy the corresponding conditions from [11, 12]. All
notations and concepts of [11, 12] will be used too. It is supposed that each
component of the vector pay-off function ρ(h(T )) = (ρ1(h(T )), . . . , ρN (h(T ))) is
a linear strongly continuous (s.-continuous) functional in H, where H = L2(Ω)×
(H12 (Ω))
∗ for σ1 = 1 and H = H−12 (Ω)× (H22,0(Ω))∗, (where H22,0(Ω) = H22 (Ω) ×
H10 (Ω)) for σ1 = 0 and h(t) = (y(t, .), y
′(t, .)) ∈ H, ∀t ∈ [t0, T ], [11, Theorem 1].
The aim of the first player is to minimize all the components of ρ(h(T )) choosing
a strategy U ∈ U . The aim of the second player is the opposite – to maximize
these components by means of the strategy V ∈ V. The strategies of the players
are defined by the functions ui and vi, i = 1, 2, (see [11, 12]). It is supposed in
addition, that these functions satisfy the conditions: ui = ui(t) ∈ Pi(t) ⊂ Rri ,
vi = vi(t) ∈ Qi(t) ⊂ Rmi , i = 1, 2, where the sets Pi(t) and Qi(t), i = 1, 2 are
uniformly bounded with respect to t, ∀t ∈ [t0, T ]. Let us remind that the solution
of the boundary-value problem of the type (1.2) is considered as in [11, Lemma
1]. The following two multicriterial dynamic problems will correspond to the
controllable system Ξ of (1.1) [12, Section 2]:
(1.3) 〈Ξ(1),U , {−ρi(h(1)(T ))}i∈N〉
and
(1.4) 〈Ξ(2),V, {ρi(h(2)(T ))}i∈N〉, h(j) = (y(j), ∂y(j)/∂t), j = 1, 2,
described by the corresponding boundary-value problems
(1.5)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∂2y(1)/∂t2 = Ay(1) + b1u1 + 0, 5f1 in G = (t0, T )×Ω,
y
(1)
|t=t0
= 0, 5y0, ∂y
(1)/∂t|t=t0 = 0, 5y1 in Ω
σ1∂y
(1)/∂νA + σ2y
(1) = b2u2 + 0, 5f2 in Σ = (t0, T )× Γ
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and
(1.6)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∂2y(2)/∂t2 = Ay(2) + c1v1 + 0, 5f1 in G = (t0, T )× Ω,
y
(2)
|t=t0
= 0, 5y0, ∂y
(2)/∂t|t=t0 = 0, 5y1 in Ω
σ1∂y
(2)/∂νA + σ2y
(2) = c2v2 + 0, 5f2 in Σ = (t0, T )× Γ.
It is supposed that the sets U and V consist only of program strategies. The
following assertion is valid:
Lemma 1.1 [12, Lemma 2.2]. Let the fixed vector ε ∈ RN≥ be given and
let U ε ∈ U and V ε ∈ V be program strategies. Then the situation (U ε, V ε) is
an ε-Slater saddle point of (1.1) if and only if U ε and V ε are ε-Slater maximal
strategies of problems (1.3) and (1.4), respectively.
Further we shall apply Lemma 1.1 for game (0.2).
Let the vector ε ∈ RN> be fixed and let Uε and Vε be the sets of program
ε-Slater maximal strategies U ε and V ε of multicriterial problems (1.3) and (1.4),
respectively. We denote
Y (1) =
⋃
Uε∈Uε
ρ(h(1)(T ; t0, 0, 5y0, 0, 5y1, U
ε)),
Y (2) =
⋃
V ε∈Vε
ρ(h(2)(T ; t0, 0, 5y0, 0, 5y1, V
ε)),
where h(j)(.) = (y(j)(.), ∂y(j)(.)/∂t), j = 1, 2, and y(1)(.; t0, 0, 5y0, 0, 5y1, U
ε) and
y(2)(.; t0, 0, 5y0, 0, 5y1, V
ε) are the solutions of boundary-value problems (1.5) and
(1.6) for U ε ÷ uε(t) and V ε ÷ vε(t), t0 ≦ t≦T , respectively. Let Y (1) + Y (2) =
{a+ b | a ∈ Y (1), b ∈ Y (2)}. The following assertion is valid:
Lemma 1.2. Let the vector ε ∈ RN> be fixed. Then
1. The set of the program ε-Slater minimaxes for game (1.1) coincides
with the set of the ε-Slater minimal points of the set Y (1) + Y (2).
2. The set of the program ε-Slater maximins for game (1.1) coincides with
the set of the ε-Slater maximal points of the set Y (1) + Y (2).
Lemma 1.2 is proved by analogy to [9, p. 82-85, Assertion 8.2] or [10,
Theorem 2], taking into account that the sets Y (1) and Y (2) are bounded [11,
Theorem 1].
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In connection with problem (1.4), the following auxiliary problem of op-
timal control is considered:
(1.7) 〈Ξ(2),V, ρβ(h(T ))〉,
where the controllable system Ξ(2) is described by boundary-value problem (1.6),
where for simplification of the symbols, the upper index (2) at y(2) and h(2) will
be omitted, V is the set of the strategies V of the second player in game (1.1),
the functional ρβ(h(T )) =
∑
i∈N
βiρi(h(T )) is linear and s.-continuous in H and the
vector β = (β1, . . . , βN ) ∈M =
{
β ∈ RN≥ |
∑
i∈N
βi = 1
}
.
We should note that for multicriterial problem (1.3), the corresponding
auxiliary problem of optimal control is of the form
(1.8) 〈Ξ(1),U ,−ρβ(h(T ))〉.
Let us remind that if ρ = (ρ1, . . . , ρN ) is a vector functional and V is a positional
(in the general case) strategy, then LIM
δ→0
ρ(h∆[T ; t0, y0, y1, V ]) =

lim
δ→0
inf
h∆[.],
δ(∆)≦δ
ρ1(h∆[T ; t0, y0, y1, V ]), . . . , lim
δ→0
inf
h∆[.],
δ(∆)≦δ
ρN (h∆[T ; t0, y0, y1, V ])

 ,
where lim inf is taken over all the step motions h∆[.] = h∆[T ; t0, y0, y1, V ], which
is caused by the strategy V , the arbitrary partition ∆ ∈∆ of the interval [t0, T ]
with δ(∆)≦ δ and the initial position p0 = {t0, y0, y1}, see [11].
(LIM
δ→0
ρ(h∆[T ; t0, y0, y1, V ]) is defined by analogy, [11, 12]).
Definition 1.1. Let γ > 0 be a fixed number. The strategy V γ ∈ V is
called a γ-maximal strategy of problem of optimal control (1.7), if there exists a
constant δ(γ) > 0 such that for ∀V ∈ V and for ∀h∆[.] = h∆[.; t0, 0, 5y0, 0, 5y1, V ]
with δ(∆)≦ δ(γ), the following inequality is valid:
ρβ(h∆[T ])− γ ≦ lim
δ→0
inf
h∆[.],
δ(∆)≦δ
ρβ(h∆[T ; t0, 0, 5y0, 0, 5y1, V
γ ])
= LIM
δ→0
ρβ(h∆[T ; t0, 0, 5y0, 0, 5y1, V
γ ]).
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The number cγ = LIM
δ→0
ρβ(h∆[T ; t0, 0, 5y0, 0, 5y1, V
γ ]) is called γ-maximum of the
functional ρβ(h(T )).
Let us point out that in Definition 1.1, the strategy V γ ∈ V is positional
(in the general case) and ρβ is a scalar functional.
Hence we should note that the concept for γ-maximal strategy of problem
(1.7) given in Definition 1.1 follows from the definition for γ-Slater maximal
strategy of problem (1.4) for the scalar functionals (N = 1), i.e. for N = {1}, see
[12, Definition 2.1].
The connection between the solutions of problems (1.4) and (1.7) is given
by the following assertions:
Lemma 1.3. Let ε ∈ RN> be a fixed vector and let V ε ∈ V be an ε-Slater
maximal strategy of problem (1.4), [12, Definition 2.1]. Then there exists a vector
β ∈M such that V ε is a γ-maximal strategy of problem (1.7), where γ ≧∑
i∈N
βiεi.
Corollary 1.3. Let one and the same strategy V ∗ ∈ V be an ε-Slater
maximal strategy of problem (1.4) ∀ε ∈ RN> . Then there exists a vector β ∈ M
such that V ∗ is a γ-maximal strategy of problem (1.7) for each number γ > 0.
We have to point out that similar assertions for the parabolic case are
obtained by Matveev [8]. For the proof of Lemma 1.3, at first we give the following
definition:
Definition 1.2. The set Y ⊆ Rm is called effective convex, if the set
Y∗ = Y − Rm≧ = {y∗ ∈ Rm | y∗≦ y for some y ∈ Y } is convex, [4, p. 104].
Now, the following set is considered:
Dδ(ε)(T ; t0, 0, 5y0, 0, 5y1)
def
== {h∆[T ; t0, 0, 5y0, 0, 5y1, V ] | V ∈ V, δ(∆)≦ δ(ε)}.
From the definitions of program and positional strategies and step motions, see
[11, p. 27], it follows that
Dδ(ε)(T ; t0, 0, 5y0, 0, 5y1) = D(T ; t0, 0, 5y0, 0, 5y1)
= {h(T ) = h(T ; t0, 0, 5y0, 0, 5y1, v(.)) | v(.) ∈ Q(t0, T ]}.
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Since the set Q(t0, T ] is convex and ρi(.),∀i ∈ N are linear and s.-continuous
functionals, then
ρ(Dδ(ε)(T ; t0, 0, 5y0, 0, 5y1))− ε = {ρ(h) − ε | h ∈ Dδ(ε)(T ; t0, 0, 5y0, 0, 5y1)}
is an effective convex set in RN , (Definition 1.2) and
LIM
δ→0
ρ(h∆[T ; t0, 0, 5y0, 0, 5y1, V
ε])
is an weak effective Slater maximal vector [4, p. 33] for this set. According to [4,
p. 104, Theorem 1 (U)], there exists a vector β ∈M such that
(1.9)
∑
i∈N
[βiρi(h∆[T ])− βiεi]
≦
∑
i∈N
β lim
δ→0
inf
h∆[.],
δ(∆)≦δ
ρi(h∆[T ; t0, 0, 5y0, 0, 5y1, V
ε])
≦ lim
δ→0
inf
h∆[.],
δ(∆)≦δ
ρβ(h∆[T ; t0, 0, 5y0, 0, 5y1, V
ε]),
∀V ∈ V and h∆[.] ∈ h∆[.; t0, 0, 5y0, 0, 5y1, V ] with δ(∆)≦ δ(ε).
If γ ≧ γ1 =
∑
i∈N
βiεi > 0, from (1.9),
ρβ(h∆[T ])− γ ≦ lim
δ→0
inf
h∆[.],
δ(∆)≦δ
ρβ(h∆[T ; t0, 0, 5y0, 0, 5y1, V
ε])
and from Definition 1.1 it follows that V ε is a γ-maximal strategy of problem
(1.7), hence Lemma 1.3 is obtained.
For the proof of Corollary 1.3, we take into account that for ∀ε0 ∈ RN> ,
the set
⋃
0N<ε<ε0
{ρ(Dδ(ε)(T ; t0, 0, 5y0, 0, 5y1))−ε} is effective convex and the vector
LIM
δ→0
ρ(h∆[T ; t0, 0, 5y0, 0, 5y1, V
∗]) is weak effective Slater maximal for this set.
Let us point out that Lemma 1.3 and Corollary 1.3 are valid in the case,
when the set V does not consist only of program strategies.
Remark. Let the sets U and V of game (1.1) do not consist only of
program strategies. Then we can describe the set of all ε-Slater saddle points
consisting of program strategies of game (1.1) for ∀ε ∈ RN> , by means of Lemma
1.1, Lemma 1.3, Corollary 1.3 and [11, Lemma 4 and Corollary 4], since these
assertions are valid in this more general case.
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2. An approximation model. In this section we consider a method of
constructing of ε-Slater saddle point of linear problem of type (1.1) with a scalar
pay-off function
(2.1) 〈Ξ, {U ,V}, {ρ1(h(T ))}〉,
which is based on finite dimensional approximation models. Approximation
schemes are applied to dynamical systems described by parabolic or hyperbolic
boundary-value problems with a scalar pay-off function in [3, 8, 11]. The ap-
proximation of game (2.1) by using [3] will be considered in this section. The
obtained results are analogous to [1] and [8].
At first, the following sequence of antagonistic differential games with a
scalar pay-off function is introduced:
(2.2) Γk = 〈Ξk, {Uk,Vk}, ρk(hk[T ])〉, k = 1, 2, . . . .
In Γk, the controllable system Ξk is described by the following system of ordinary
differential equations:
(2.3)
d2ykj
dt2
+ λjy
k
j = 〈b1u1 + c1v1 + f1, ωj〉L2(Ω) + 〈b2u2 + c2v2 + f2, F (ωj)〉Γ,
ykj (t0) = 〈y0, ωj〉,
dykj
dt
(t0) = 〈y1, ωj〉, j = 1, . . . , k,
where F (ϕ)
def
==
{ −∂ϕ/∂νA for σ1 = 0
ϕ for σ1 = 1
and {λj , ωj}, j = 1, 2, . . . is the so-
lution of the spectral problem Aωj = −λωj in Ω, σ1∂ωj/∂νA + σ2ωj = 0 in Γ.
Obviously that system (2.3) can be presented as a linear system of ordinary dif-
ferential equations in relation to hkj = (y
k
j , dy
k
j /dt), j = 1, . . . , k, ∀k = 1, 2, . . . .
Furthermore for ∀k = 1, 2, . . ., the position of the controllable system Ξk in the
moment t ∈ [t0, T ] is described by the phase vector hk(t) = (hk1(t), . . . , hkk(t)) of
R
2k. A positional strategy of the first player Uk = Uk(t1, t2, h
k(t1)) is a mapping,
for which to every ordered triplet (t1, t2, h
k(t1)) ∈ [t0, T )× (t1, T ]×R2k there cor-
responds a unique, measurable function u ∈ P (t1, t2]. The set of these strategies
of the game Γk is denoted by Uk. The positional strategies of the game Γk of the
second player are defined by analogy and the set of these strategies is denoted
by Vk.
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Following [3], we define the operators Sk : H → Rk and Ak : Rk → H
such that Sky = (〈y, ω1〉, . . . , 〈y, ωk〉), k = 1, 2, . . . and Akyk =
k∑
j=1
ykj ωj, where
yk
def
== (yk1 (t), . . . , y
k
k(t)), k = 1, 2, . . ., H = L2(Ω) for σ1 = 1 and H = H
−1
2 (Ω)
for σ1 = 0. The result of game (2.2) for fixed number k = 1, 2, . . . is evalu-
ated by the functional ρk(.) : R2k → R, which is defined such that ρk(hk[T ]) =
ρ1(A
kyk[T ],
d
dt
Akyk[T ]) = ρ1(A
khk[T ]), where ρ1(.) is the functional of (2.1).
For each k = 1, 2, . . ., ρk(.) is a continuous functional in R2k, since the
operator (Ak(.),
d
dt
Ak(.)) : R2k → H and the functional ρ1(.) : H → R are
continuous. Then for every fixed natural number k, there exists a saddle point
(U0k, V 0k) ∈ Uk × Vk with a value ck0 in game (2.2), where U0k and V 0k are
positional strategies, see for example [5, p. 76-79].
Now the results of [3] will be used, since the parameters of game (2.1)
satisfy the corresponding conditions of [3]. In [11, p. 32, proof of Theorem 2] was
proved that all conditions of [3, Theorem 2.1] are satisfied, so that Theorem 2.1
of [3] can be applied with respect to the set M = M1(c0) = {h ∈ H|ρ1(h)≦ c0},
where c0 is the value of game (2.1), see [11, proof of Theorem 2]. Moreover,
the evasion problem from the set M1(c0) can be solved by a strategy from the
type V (t1, t2, h) = V
∗
k (t1, t2, A
∗
k(t1)h) = V
∗
k (t1, t2, (S
ky, Sky′)), see [3, p. 1014],
where V ∗k is the corresponding “extremal” strategy, connected with system (2.3),
Sk = Sk(t1) and the defined in [3] operator A
∗
k is analogous to the defined above
operator Sk, (for simplification of the symbols, further we denote Sk instead of
Sk(t1)). Analogous assertion is true for the ε-approach problem with M1(c0),
which is solved by the corresponding extremal strategy U∗k (.). Thus, using the
results of [3] and the fact that ‖ρk(hk[T ]) − ρ1(h[T ])‖ → 0 for k → ∞ since
the functional ρ1(.) is strong continuous in H, we obtain the following assertion
(analogous assertions with respect to parabolic dynamic system are proved in [1]
and [8]):
Lemma 2.1. Let ck0 and (U
0k, V 0k) ∈ Uk × Vk be the value and the
saddle point of game (2.2) respectively ∀k = 1, 2, . . . and let c0 be the value of
game (2.1). Then
1. For each number γ > 0, ∃k0 : ∀k≧ k0 (k and k0 are natural num-
bers), there exists a constant δ(k, γ) > 0 such that ∀h∆[.] = h∆[.; p0, U∗, V ∗] with
δ(∆)≦ δ(k, γ), the following inequality is valid: |c0 − ρ1(h∆[T ])|≦ γ, where the
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strategies U∗ ∈ U and V ∗ ∈ V in game (2.1) are defined as follows:
U∗(t1, t2, h) = U
ok(t1, t2, (S
ky, Sky′)) and V ∗(t1, t2, h) = V
ok(t1, t2, (S
ky, Sky′)),
2. Moreover ck0 → c0 for k →∞.
We shall apply this assertion for the sequence of problems
(2.4) Γ
(2)
k = 〈Ξ(2)k ,Vk, ρk(hk[T ])〉, k = 1, 2, . . . .
The sequence of problems (2.4), related to problem (1.7) is constructed by analogy
to the sequence of games (2.2), related to game (2.1). The difference is that in
(2.4) there is only one (maximizing) player. From Lemma 2.1 and [11, Theorem
2] there exist a maximal strategy V ok ∈ Vk maximizing ρk(hk[T ]) and numbers
c(2) and c
(2)
k , which are the maximal values of ρβ(h[T ]) and ρ
k(hk[T ]) respectively
for problems (1.7) and Γ
(2)
k of (2.4), ∀k = 1, 2, . . .. Thus from Lemma 2.1, the
following assertion is obtained:
Corollary 2.1. Let c
(2)
k be the maximal value of ρ
k(hk[T ]), V ok ∈
Vk – the corresponding maximizing strategy of problem (2.4) and let c(2) be the
maximum of ρβ(h[T ]) in (1.7). Then
1. For each number γ > 0, ∃k0 : ∀k≧ k0 (k and k0 are natural numbers),
there exists a constant number δ(k, γ) > 0 such that
∀h∆[.] = h∆[.; p0, V ∗] with δ(∆)≦ δ(k, γ),
the following inequality is valid: |c(2)−ρβ(h∆[T ])|≦ γ, where the strategy V ∗ ∈ V
in problem (1.7) is defined as follows: V ∗(t1, t2, h) = V
ok(t1, t2, (S
ky, Sky′)) ,
2. Moreover c
(2)
k → c(2) for k →∞.
Thus, the solution of problem (1.7) in the space H is approximated (with
arbitrary level of exactness, given in advance) by the sequence of problems (2.4)
in R2k, k≧ 1, the solution of which is “less complicated” than the solution of (1.7).
The game Γk of (2.2) is considered for some fixed natural number k.
The sufficient conditions, for which the usage of program strategies leads to the
same result as the usage of positional strategies, are obtained in [6, p. 129-133].
In particular, if the controllable system is described by a linear (with respect
to the phase variable and the control functions) system of ordinary differential
equations with convex set of values of the control and linear scalar pay-off function
ρk(hk[T ]), then these sufficient conditions are satisfied. Indeed, let the function
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ρ˜(l)
def
== sup{h′l − ρk(h) | h ∈ R2k} and L = dom ρ˜(.) = {l ∈ R2k | ρ˜(l) <∞}, see
[6, p. 130, (5.8)]. Since the functional ρk(.) is linear and continuous, the set L
consists only of one point l0 ∈ R2k, moreover ρ˜(l0) = 0, i.e. L = {l0} and hence
the requirements of [6, p. 132, Corollary] are satisfied.
Now the problem of optimal control Γ
(2)
k from (2.4) is considered. Then
the maximum of the linear and s.-continuous functional ρk(hk[T ]) on the set of
positional strategies coincides with the maximum of the same functional on the set
of program strategies. Therefore, further we shall look for the control V ok ∈ Vk,
which is maximizing the functional ρk(hk[T ]) in the set of program strategies.
This approach to a large extent will make considerably easier the finding of V ok
and ck0 .
From Corollary 2.1, the solution of problem (2.4) approximates (with
arbitrary given level of exactness) the auxiliary problem of optimal control (1.7).
It means that ∀γ > 0, using the above described approximation scheme, there
can be constructed a γ-maximal solution of problem (1.7), for which this solution
is attained for program strategies.
3. Solution of game (0.2). Let us return to the considerations of game
(0.2). The controllable system Ξ(2) for the considered problem, analogous to (1.4)
is described by the following boundary-value problem of hyperbolic type:
(3.1)
∂2y/∂t2 = ∂2y/∂x2 in G = (0, 1) × (0, pi)
y(0, x) = (∂y/∂t)(0, x) = 0 in Ω = (0, pi)
−(∂y/∂x)(t, 0) = v(t), (∂y/∂x)(t, pi) = 0 for t ∈ (0, 1),
where the upper index (2) at y(2) and h(2) will be omitted. The aim of the second
player is (by means of the choice of the program strategy V ∈ V10 ) the attainment
of possible larger values of the two components of the vector functuonal
ρ(h(T )) = (ρ1(h(1)), ρ2(h(1))) =
(∫ pi
0
y′(1, x)dx,−
∫ pi/2
0
y(1, x)dx
)
.
This multicriterial problem will be denoted by
(3.2) 〈Ξ(2),V10 , {ρ1(h(2)(1)), ρ2(h(2)(1))}〉
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further on. By analogy, the multicriterial problem of the type (1.3) for the first
player will be denoted by
(3.3) 〈Ξ(1),U10 , {−ρ1(h(1)(1)),−ρ2(h(1)(1))}〉.
The problem of optimal control, analogous to (1.7) for (3.2), is of the form
Γβ = 〈Ξ ÷ (3.1),V10 , ρβ(h(T ))〉,
where Ξ is described by (3.1) (i.e. by the dynamic system of (3.2)), and the scalar
criterion is presented by the functional
ρβ(h(T )) = β
∫ pi
0
y′(1, x)dx − (1− β)
∫ pi/2
0
y(1, x)dx,
where the scalar parameter β ∈ [0, 1].
Multicriterial problem (3.2) will be solved if we obtain all the γ-maximal
strategies and the respective γ-maximums for the problem Γβ for each γ > 0 and
β ∈ [0, 1]. Indeed, from [11, Corollary 4] and Corollary 1.3, the program strategy
V ∗ ∈ V10 is γ-maximal ∀γ > 0 of the problem Γβ for some β ∈ [0, 1], if and only
if V ∗ is ε-Slater maximal ∀ε ∈ R2> of problem (3.2).
Hence we shall look for all the γ-maximal program strategies of Γβ,∀γ > 0
for each β ∈ [0, 1]. To this end, the corresponding sequence of problems Γ(2)k from
(2.4) is considered. In the considered case the eigenvalues λj = j
2, j = 0, 1, 2, . . .
and the eigenfunctions ω0(x) =
√
1/pi, ωj(x) =
√
2/picos jx, j = 1, 2, . . .. Then
the approximating system is of the form
(3.4)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
d2yk0/dt
2 =
√
1/piv
yk0 (0) = 0
(yk0 )
′(0) = 0
⇐⇒
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
dyk0/dt = z
k
o
dzk0/dt =
√
1/piv
yk0(0) = z
k
0 (0) = 0∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
d2ykj /dt
2 = −j2ykj +
√
2/piv
ykj (0) = 0
(ykj )
′(0) = 0
⇐⇒
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
dykj /dt = z
k
j
dzkj /dt = −j2ykj +
√
2/piv
ykj (0) = z
k
j (0) = 0
j = 1, 2, . . . , k
and the linear s.-continuous functional
ρkβ(h
k(T ))=β
√
pi(yk0 )
′(1)−(1−β)
[√pi
2
yk0(1)+
√
2/pi(yk1 (1)−
1
3
yk3(1)+
1
5
yk5(1)− . . .)
]
,
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where the number of the terms with multiplier (1−β)
√
2/pi is k/2 or [k/2]+1, for
even or odd number k respectively. (Here [k/2] is the entire part of the number
k/2). The solution of (3.4) is of the form
yk0(t) =
1√
pi
∫ t
0
∫ τ
0
v(ξ)dξdτ, ykj (t) = j
−1
√
2/pi
∫ t
0
v(τ)sin j(t− τ)dτ,
j = 1, 2, . . . , k and the value of the functional ρkβ(.) for this solution is
(3.5)
ρkβ(h
k(1)) = β
∫ 1
0
v(τ)dτ − (1− β)
[1
2
∫ 1
0
∫ t
0
v(τ)dτdt
+
2
pi
∫ 1
0
v(τ)(sin (1− τ)− 1
32
sin 3(1 − τ) + 1
52
sin 5(1− τ)− . . .)dτ
]
,
and the number of the terms in the last integral in (3.5) is as it is indicated above.
Preliminary, some properties about the derivative of the function
(3.6) C2k(t)
def
== sin t− 1
32
sin 3t+
1
52
sin 5t− . . .+ (−1)
k−1
(2k − 1)2 sin (2k − 1)t
will be proved.
Lemma 3.1. Let k≧ 1 be a natural number and
B2k(t) = cos t− 1
3
cos 3t+
1
5
cos 5t− . . .+ (−1)
k−1
2k − 1 cos (2k − 1)t. Then
a) |2/piB2k(t)− 1/2| < 1/k, ∀t ∈ [0, 1], ∀k≧ 1,
b) |2/piB2k(t)− 1/2|≦ 2
pi
· 1, 095
2k
<
0, 7
2k
, ∀t ∈ [0, 1] for k≧ 100.
P r o o f. The following equalities are valid:
(3.7)
B2k(t) =
∫ t
pi/2
[−sin τ + sin 3τ − . . .+ (−1)ksin (2k − 1)τ ]dτ
=
∫ t
pi/2
(−1)k sin 2kτ
2cos τ
dτ =
1
2
∫ pi/2−t
0
sin 2kτ
sin τ
dτ
=
1
2
∫ pi/2−t
0
sin 2kτ
τ
dτ +
1
2
∫ pi/2−t
0
(
τ − sin τ
τsin τ
)
sin 2kτdτ.
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Let the function ϕ(t) =
t− sin t
tsin t
for t ∈ (0, pi/2] and ϕ(0) = 0. It will be
proved that ϕ(t) ∈ C1[0, pi/2] is monotonously increasing function with respect
to t ∈ [0, pi/2] and the following inequalities are valid:
(3.8) 0≦ϕ′(t) < 1/2, ∀t ∈ [0, pi/2], 0≦ϕ(t)≦ 1− 2/pi, ∀t ∈ [0, pi/2],
where the respective equalities are reached only for t = 0 or t = pi/2. Indeed, tak-
ing into account the inequalities sin t≧ t− t3/6, ∀t≧ 0 and cos t≦ 1− t2/2+ t4/24,
∀t≧ 0, we obtain that ϕ′(t) = sin
2t− t2cos t
t2sin 2t
=
(sin t/t)2 − cos t
sin 2t
≧
≧
1
sin 2t
[(
1− t
2
6
)2
− 1 + t
2
2
− t
4
24
]
=
t2
6sin 2t
(1 − t2/12)≧ 0 for t ∈ [0, pi/2],
and ϕ′(t)≦
sin 2t− sin 2tcos t
t2sin 2t
=
1− cos t
t2
=
2sin 2(t/2)
t2
≦
2(t/2)2
t2
=
1
2
, which
proves the first inequality of (3.8). Hence 0 = ϕ(0)≦ϕ(t)≦ϕ(pi/2) = 1 − 2/pi,
∀t ∈ [0, pi/2], which proves (3.8).
In the first integral of (3.7) we change the variables τ → 2kτ , and in the
second integral of (3.7) we integrate by parts, through which
B2k(t) =
1
2
∫ 2k(pi/2−t)
0
sin τ
τ
dτ − 1
4k
(pi/2 − t)− sin (pi/2− t)
(pi/2 − t)sin (pi/2 − t) cos 2k(pi/2 − t)
+
1
4k
∫ pi/2−t
0
ϕ′(τ)cos 2kτdτ =
1
2
∫ +∞
0
sin τ
τ
dτ +
1
2
∫ +∞
2k(pi/2−t)
d(cos τ)
τ
− 1
4k
ϕ(pi/2 − t)cos 2k(pi/2 − t) + 1
4k
∫ pi/2−t
0
ϕ′(τ)cos 2kτdτ
is obtained. Integrating by parts once more and taking into account that∫ ∞
0
sin τ
τ
dτ = pi/2, we obtain that
B2k(t) =
pi
4
− 1
4k(pi/2 − t)cos 2k(pi/2 − t)
[
1 +
(pi/2− t)− sin (pi/2 − t)
sin (pi/2 − t)
]
+
1
4k
∫ pi/2−t
0
ϕ′(τ)cos 2kτdτ +
1
2
∫ +∞
2k(pi/2−t)
cos τ
τ2
dτ
=
pi
4
− cos 2k(pi/2 − t)
4ksin (pi/2− t) +
1
4k
∫ pi/2−t
0
ϕ′(τ)cos 2kτdτ +
1
2
∫ +∞
2k(pi/2−t)
cos τ
τ2
dτ.
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Hence
(3.9)
∣∣∣B2k(t)− pi
4
∣∣∣≦ 1
4k
[
1
sin (pi/2 − t) +
1
2
(pi
2
− t
)]
+
1
2
2
1
4k2(pi/2− t)2
≦
2, 15
4k
+ 1/k2.
The inequalities of Lemma 3.1 follow from (3.9). Lemma 3.1 is proved.
Taking into account that C2k(1− t) = −
∫ t
1
B2k(1−τ)dτ and Lemma 3.1,
the following assertion is obtained:
Corollary 3.1. Let k≧ 1 be an arbitrary natural number. Then the
following inequalities are valid:
a)
∣∣∣∣ 2piC2k(1− t)− 0, 5(1 − t)
∣∣∣∣ < 1/k, ∀t ∈ [0, 1], ∀k≧ 1,
b)
∣∣∣∣ 2piC2k(1− t)− 0, 5(1 − t)
∣∣∣∣≦ 2pi · 1, 0952k < 0, 72k , ∀t ∈ [0, 1] for k≧ 100.
Now we return to equality (3.5). Since ρ2k−1β (h
2k−1(1)) = ρ2kβ (h
2k(1)),
without restriction it can be considered that k is an even number, i.e. in (3.5)
will be considered ρ2kβ (h
2k(1)). Then
(3.10)
ρ2kβ (h
2k(1))=
∫ 1
0
[
β − (1− β) 2
pi
C2k(1− t)
]
v(t)dt − 1− β
2
∫ 1
0
∫ t
0
v(τ)dτdt
=(1− β)
[∫ 1
0
(
β1 − 2
pi
C2k(1− t)
)
v(t)dt − 1
2
∫ 1
0
V (t)dt
]
,
β1 = β/(1 − β) for β 6= 1,
where C2k(t) was defined in (3.6) and
(3.11) g2k(t)
def
== β1 − 2
pi
C2k(1− t), V (t) def==
∫ t
0
v(τ)dτ.
When β 6= 1, ρ2kβ (h2k(1)) = (1 − β)
[∫ 1
0
g2k(t)v(t)dt − 1
2
∫ 1
0
V (t)dt
]
and
the maximization of ρ2kβ (h
2k(1)) is equivalent to the minimization of the functional
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1
2
∫ 1
0
V (t)dt −
∫ 1
0
g2k(t)v(t)dt, where g2k(t) and V (t) are defined in (3.11), the
function v(t) ∈ V10 = {V ÷ v(.) | |v(t)|≦ 1,∀t ∈ [0, 1]} and V ′(t) = v(t), V (0) = 0.
This problem can be solved using the methods of [7, p. 91-106]. According to
the symbols accepted there, in our case f0(V, v, t) =
1
2
V − g2k(t)v, Φ(V ) ≡ 0,
the adjoint problem [7, p. 100, (36)] satisfies the conditions ψ′(t) =
1
2
, ψ(1) = 0,
hence ψ(t) = 0, 5t− 0, 5. In this case all the conditions of [7, p. 101, Theorem 4]
are satisfied. Then the optimal control vkβ(.) is found from the inequality [7, p.
101, (38)]: ∫ 1
0
(−g2k(t)− 0, 5t+ 0, 5)(v(t) − vkβ(t))dt≧ 0, i.e.∫ 1
0
(−g2k(t)− 0, 5t+ 0, 5)vkβ(t))dt≦
∫ 1
0
(−g2k(t)− 0, 5t+ 0, 5)v(t)dt
for each function v(t) ∈ V10 . Since vkβ(t) ∈ V10 , it is obtained that
(3.12) vkβ(t) = sign(g2k(t) + 0, 5t− 0, 5) for t ∈ [0, 1],
where the function g2k(t) depends on β1 = β/(1 − β). (If f(t) is an arbitrary
continuous function for t ∈ [0, 1], here sign f(t) denotes the function-element of
L∞[0, 1], which is equal to −1 for f(t) < 0; 1 for f(t) > 0 and 0 for f(t) = 0).
If in (3.12) a formal limited transition for k →∞ is done, from Corollary 3.1 we
obtain the function
(3.13) vβ(t) = sign(t+ β1 − 1) = sign(t− τ0) =
{
−1 for 0≦ t≦ τ0
1 for τ0 < t≦ 1
for β ∈ [0, 0,5), where τ0 = (1− 2β)/(1−β) ∈ (0, 1] and vβ(t) ≡ 1 for β ∈ [0,5, 1],
(for β = 1 vβ(t) ≡ 1, which is verified directly from (3.10)). We shall show that
there exists a natural number k0 ≧ 1 such that for ∀k≧ k0 and β ∈ [0, 1], the
function vkβ(t) is presented in one of the following three types:
(3.14)
vkβ(t) =
{
−1 for 0≦ t≦ τk0
1 for τk0 < t≦ 1
, (τk0 ∈ [0, 1])
or vkβ(t) ≡ 1,∀t ∈ [0, 1] or vkβ(t) ≡ −1,∀t ∈ [0, 1].
Indeed, from (3.11) and Lemma 3.1 a),
(
g2k(t) +
1
2
t− 1
2
)′
=
1
2
+
2
pi
B2k(1−
t) > 0 ∀t ∈ [0, 1] and ∀k≧ 1, which shows that the function g2k(t) + 0, 5t − 0, 5
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is strictly monotonously increasing with respect to t ∈ [0, 1]. Hence there is not
more than one root of the equation g2k(t) + 0, 5t − 0, 5 = 0 in the interval [0, 1],
which (if there exists) will be denoted by τk0 . Moreover from the definition of
the function g2k(t) from (3.11), it can be showed that for ∀k≧ 5, the function
g2k(t) + 0, 5t − 0, 5 is negative in a small neighbourhood of the point t = 0 for
each β1 ≦ 0, 25 and positive in a small neighbourhood of t = 1 ∀β1≧ 0, 25. Thus
the assertion about the representation of the function vkβ in one of the indicated
types of (3.14) is proved.
If there exists a root τk0 , then τ
k
0 = 2
(
1
2
+
2
pi
C2k(1− τk0 )− β1
)
⇒
τk0 − τ0 = 2
(
1
2
+
2
pi
C2k(1− τk0 )− β1
)
− τ0 = 4
pi
C2k(1− τk0 )− β1
=
(
4
pi
C2k(1− τk0 )− (1− τk0 )
)
+ (1− τk0 − β1)
=
(
4
pi
C2k(1− τk0 )− (1− τk0 )
)
− (τk0 − τ0).
Hence τk0 − τ0 =
(
2
pi
C2k(1− τk0 )− 0, 5(1 − τk0 )
)
. From Corollary 3.1, |τk0 − τ0|
< 1/k, ∀k≧ 1 and |τk0 − τ0| <
0, 7
2k
for k≧ 100. In the case, when β = 1, it is
verified directly that the functional ρ2kβ (h
2k(1)) is maximized for vkβ(t) ≡ 1 and
in this case vkβ(t) ≡ vβ(t) ≡ 1, ∀t ∈ [0, 1]. All this proves that vkβ(t) → vβ(t) at
L2(0, 1) norm for k →∞. Then
 k∑
j=1
ykj (t)ωj(x),
k∑
j=1
(ykj (t))
′ωj(x)

 −

 k∑
j=1
yj(t)ωj(x),
k∑
j=1
y′j(t)ωj(x)

→ 0
at C([0, 1],H) norm [11, Theorem 1], where H = L2(0, pi) × (H12 (0, pi))∗, ykj and
yj are the solutions of the system of ordinary differential equations (3.4) for v
k
β(t)
and vβ(t) respectively and the functional ρ(.) is s.-continuous in H. Hence
lim
k→∞
ρ

 ∞∑
j=k+1
yj(t)ωj(x),
∞∑
j=k+1
y′j(t)ωj(x)

 = 0,
where yj(t) are the solutions of system (3.4) for an arbitrary function v(t) ∈ V10
and moreover this convergence is uniform with respect to v(t) ∈ V10 , see [11,
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Theorem 1]. Hence vβ(t), ∀β ∈ [0, 1] are all the γ-maximal strategies of problem
Γβ ∀γ > 0 and then vβ(t) ∀β ∈ [0, 1] are all the ε-Slater maximal strategies
∀ε ∈ R2> of problem (3.2). Moreover, every function of the type (3.13) where
τ0 ∈ [0, 1] is an arbitrary real number, is an ε-Slater maximal program strategy
of problem (3.2) ∀ε ∈ R2>. On the other hand, for every vector ε ∈ R2> there
exists a natural number k0 ≧ 1 such that v
k
β(t) is an ε-Slater maximal strategy of
problem (3.2), ∀k≧ k0.
Now the set ρ(D) of the values of the vector functional in the space of
the criteria R2 for problem (3.2) will be constructed. (Here D is the domain of
attainment of the controllable system Ξ(2) of (3.2)). The set ρ(D) consists of
the vectors ρ(h(T )) for all possible program strategies V ÷ v(t) ∈ V10 . Using the
representation (3.5) and Corollary 3.1, it is proved that ρ(D) is the set of all
vectors ρ = (ρ1, ρ2) ∈ R2, for which
(ρ1, ρ2) =
(∫ 1
0
v(τ)dτ,−1
2
∫ 1
0
∫ t
0
v(τ)dτdt − 1
2
∫ 1
0
(1− τ)v(τ)dτ
) ∣∣∣ v(t)
is an arbitrary function of V10 ).
(Let us remind that the set V10 was defined in the Introduction). From Corollary
1.3 and [11, Corollary 4], all the ε-Slater maximal values of the vector functional
∀ε ∈ R2> form the set of all the vectors ρ(h(1)), for which h(.) are calculated for
v = vβ(t) defined in (3.13), where τ0 ∈ [0, 1] is an arbitrary real number. It is
easy to prove that all these ε-Slater maximal vectors ∀ε ∈ R2> are of the form
ρ = (1− 2τ0,−τ20 + 2τ0 − 0, 5), ∀τ0 ∈ [0, 1].
In Figure 3.1 the set ρ(D) is represented. The north-eastern boundary of
this domain, which is marked with a dark line, corresponds to the values of the
vector functional for v = vβ(t).
In Table 3.1 are given the values of six ε-Slater maximums ∀ε ∈ R2> of
bicriterial problem (3.2), corresponding to the points A,B,C,D,E, F and the
respective values of the parameters β ∈ [0, 1] and τ0. Here the number τ0 defines
the function vβ(t), defined from (3.13).
Now the method of calculating of the approximating strategies vkβ(.) and
the corresponding ε-maximums ρ2k(h2k(1)) will be shown. For that purpose a
program is prepared, which calculates approximately τk0 as a unique root of the
equation g2k(t) + 0, 5t − 0, 5 = 0 in the interval [0, 1] (if the root exists), where
g2k(t) is given from (3.11) and β1 = β/(1 − β). For thus defined number τk0 ,
which determines the corresponding ε-Slater maximal strategy vkβ(t) by means of
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Fig. 3.1
Table 3.1
Points Coordinates τ0 β
A (−1; 0, 5) 1 0
B (−0, 77 . . . ; 0, 4876543) 8/9 0, 1
C (−0, 5; 0, 4375) 0, 75 0, 2
D (−0, 14286; 0, 3163265) 4/7 0, 3
E (0, 33 . . . ; 0, 055 . . .) 1/3 0, 4
F (1;−0, 5) 0 ≧ 0, 5
(3.14), the respective components of the ε-maximum ρ2k(h2k(1)) are calculated.
The calculations are made for k = 100 and k = 1000. Moreover from Corollary
3.1, the ε-maximums of bicriterial problem (3.2) for εi = 0, 01, (respectively
εi = 0, 001), i = 1, 2, where ε = (ε1, ε2) ∈ R2> will be obtained. In Table 3.2
are given the coordinates of the points Ak, Bk, Ck,Dk, Ek, Fk for k = 100 and
k = 1000, calculated for the same values of the parameter β as in Table 3.1.
Moreover it is obtained that for these points |τ1000 − τ0| < 10−4, respectively
|τ10000 − τ0| < 10−6. Using these results, it can be constructed the set ρ2k(D2k)
and the corresponding set of the ε-Slater maximums for the indicated values of
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Table 3.2
Points Coordinates Coordinates β
k=100 k=1000
Ak (−1; 0, 5) (−1; 0, 5) 0
Bk (−0, 77784; 0, 48766) (−0, 777778; 0, 4876543) 0, 1
Ck (−0, 5; 0, 437502) (−0, 5; 0, 4375001) 0, 2
Dk (−0, 14292; 0, 31635) (−0, 1428564; 0, 3163262) 0, 3
Ek (0, 33328; 0, 05559) (0, 3333334; 0, 0555554) 0, 4
Fk (1;−0, 5) (1;−0, 5) 0, 5
k. Because of the rapid convergence of ρ2k(h2k(1; 0, 0, 0, vkβ)) for k →∞, the sets
ρ2k(D2k) for k = 100 and k = 1000 and the corresponding sets of the ε-Slater
maximal values of the vector functional ρ2k(h2k(1)) for the same values of k,
differ “very little” from the set ρ(D) and the set of the ε-Slater maximal vectors
∀ε ∈ R2> of the functional ρ(h(1)) respectively, which are constructed in Fig. 3.1.
Moreover, the coordinates of the corresponding points of Table 3.1 and Table 3.2
differ in absolute value no more than 0, 0001.
As the data on Table 3.2 show, for k = 1000 the coordinates of the points
differ from the coordinates of the corresponding points on Table 3.1 less than in
the case when k = 100, as it to be expected.
Bicriterial problem (3.3) for the first player is solved by analogy. The
program ε-Slater maximal ∀ε ∈ R2> (ε-Slater maximal) strategies are of the form
uβ(t) = −vβ(t) (ukβ(t) = −vkβ(t)). Thus, for reasons of symmetry, the sets ρ(D)
(ρ2k(D2k)) and the corresponding sets of the ε-Slater maximal ∀ε ∈ R2> (ε-Slater
maximal) values of the vector functional ρ(h(1))(ρ2k(h2k(1))) in the space of the
criteria R2 for the first and the second player coincide.
Now we shall consider game (0.2). The set of all the values of the vector
pay-off function ρ(.) = (ρ1(.), ρ2(.)) for game (0.2) can be obtained as an algebraic
sum of two sets
(3.15) ρ(D) + ρ(D),
where ρ(D) is the set, represented in Fig. 3.1. The set (3.15) coincides with
the set ρ(D(T ; p0)), see [11], where D(T ; p0) is the domain of attainment of the
controllable system Ξ of (0.2).
280 Diko M. Souroujon
Fig. 3.2
Table 3.3
Points Coordinates Situations(U∗, V ∗) = (u∗(t), v∗(t))
N (−2, 1) u∗(t) ≡ −1, v∗(t) ≡ −1
M (2,−1) u∗(t) ≡ 1, v∗(t) ≡ 1
0 (0, 0) u∗(t) ≡ 1, v∗(t) ≡ −1
(u∗(t) ≡ −1, v∗(t) ≡ 1)
From Lemma 1.1, all possible pairs of strategies (uβ1(t), vβ2(t)), 0 < t≦ 1,
β1 ∈ [0, 1], β2 ∈ [0, 1], where vβ(t) is defined from (3.13) and uβ(t) = −vβ(t),
form the set of the ε-Slater saddle points of game (0.2), ∀ε ∈ R2>. The set of the
values of the vector pay-off function of game (0.2) ρ(.) = (ρ1(.), ρ2(.)), calculated
for these functions uβ1 and vβ2 , β1 ∈ [0, 1], β2 ∈ [0, 1] coincides with the set of the
values of the vector pay-off function ρ(.), realizing all the ε-Slater saddle points
∀ε ∈ R2>. This set is obtained as an algebraic sum of the curves ABCDEF and
ARF of Fig. 3.1.
The set (3.15) is represented in Fig. 3.2, where the values of the vector
pay-off function ρ(.) = (ρ1(.), ρ2(.)), realizing the ε-Slater saddle points ∀ε ∈ R2>,
are hatched.
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In the same way the set ρ2k(D2k) + ρ2k(D2k) of the values of the vector pay-off
function ρ2k = (ρ2k1 , ρ
2k
2 ) and the set of the values, realizing the ε-Slater saddle
points for the corresponding values of k and ε = ε(k), can be constructed. These
sets will differ “very little” from the respective sets constructed in Fig. 3.2,
because of which they will not be constructed separately.
As a guaranteed result of the first (second) player in game (0.2), the
corresponding ε-minimax or ε-maximin can be used. From Lemma 1.2, the set of
the ε-minimaxes (ε-maximins) ∀ε ∈ R2> forms the south-western (north-eastern)
boundary of the set of the vectors, which are values of the bicomponent vector
pay-off function ρ(.) on the ε-Slater saddle points ∀ε ∈ R2>. As it had been
pointed out, in Fig. 3.2 the last set is hatched and the sets of the ε-minimaxes
(ε-maximins) ∀ε ∈ R2> are represented by the points of the curve NPOQM
(respectively the curve NLOKM).
As Fig. 3.2 shows, the ε-Slater saddle points of game (0.2) ∀ε ∈ R2> are
not equivalent. What is more, there exist two ε-Slater saddle points for which the
components of the vector pay-off function ρ(.) at one of them are greater than
the respective components for the other ε-saddle point ∀ε ∈ R2>. Therefore, the
most acceptable situation (U∗, V ∗) ∈ U10 × V10 for both players is the situation,
which is an ε-Slater saddle point ∀ε ∈ R2> and the value of the vector pay-off
function ρ(.) in this situation coincides with the ε-Slater maximin and minimax
∀ε ∈ R2>. In game (0.2) such solutions are corresponding to the values of the
vector pay-off function, which in Fig. 3.2 are represented by the points N , M , 0.
The data of these points are given in Table 3.3.
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